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ABSTRACT 
 
Retractors are individuals who have repudiated their earlier claims of having 
been sexually abused.  There has been relatively little research conducted 
with this population.  The growing literature on memory verification 
strategies and non-believed memories provide a conceptual and empirical 
lens through which to revisit the accounts of these individuals to try and learn 
more about the process of making and retracting high-stake, consequential 
beliefs or recollections about the past.  Do people attempt to validate or 
invalidate beliefs and recollections of such events in the same way as they do 
for the moderately significant events studied to date?  The paper concludes by 
re-emphasising the social and contextual nature of remembering and argues 
for the primacy of belief over recollection. 
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“This is about belief, and it’s up to me to choose what I want to believe.  
I don’t want to believe that this is the truth” (Linda Furness, in 
Pendergrast, 1996, p. 360). 
 
In 1986, Patricia Burgus was diagnosed with multiple personality disorder 
(now dissociative identity disorder).  Under the influence of drugs and 
hypnosis she recollected that she had been part of a satanic cult, had sexually 
abused her own children, cannibalized people, and had sex with a former US 
president.  Burgus eventually retracted her beliefs and recollections, and filed 
a lawsuit, claiming that mental health professionals had implanted false 
memories.   In 1997, on the day the case was due to be tried, her family 
accepted an out of court settlement of over 10 million dollars (Loftus, 1998).  
Individuals like Burgus, seem to provide clear evidence that “at least some 
individuals may develop inaccurate memories about past abuse” (Epstein & 
Bottoms, 1998, p. 1234). Yet, not all cases involve such extreme and highly 
improbable claims, and there are obvious limitations in relying on retractors’ 
accounts to formulate theory.   
 
One inevitable problem is that it is almost impossible to satisfactorily 
establish the ‘ground truth’.  In addition there are self-presentational biases 
inherent in reporting about an event (or series of events) that one no longer 
believes in (Ashmore & Brown, 2010; Blume 1995; Gudjonsson, 1997; Kassin, 
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1997; Ost, Costall & Bull 2002; Singer, 1997).  Yet, as Schooler, Bendiksen and 
Ambadar (1997) argued: 
 
“… there is simply no principled reason why we should believe 
individuals when they recover memories but then disbelieve them 
when they retract them.  Nor, for that matter, can we disbelieve 
recoveries and use retractions as evidence of memory fabrication.  
Ultimately, the fact that individuals can shift between believing and 
disbelieving … illustrates the fundamental uncertainty that surrounds 
such memories” (p. 258; see also Schacter, Norman & Koutstaal, 1997).  
 
What is important, psychologically, is to understand how people make sense 
of such fundamental uncertainties and how they come to endorse and then 
reject a belief about their past, particularly one that has such far-reaching 
consequences1. The fact that it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish the 
ground truth, and that there may be self-serving or unconscious biases in 
presenting events in a certain light (as is the case with almost any claim about 
one’s personal past, e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2003) should not prevent scientific 
enquiry.  One need not take a firm position on the existence of a deity, for 
example, in order to propose theories about the psychology of religious 
experiences (e.g., Hinde, 1999).  For example, early attempts to theorise about 
retractors’ experiences drew parallels to related literatures including 
                                                        
1
 For work investigating recantations / retractions made by child witnesses, the reader is referred to 
work by Malloy, Lyon and Quas (2007) and Lyon (2007). 
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imaginative processes, role enactment (de Rivera, 1998) and false confessions 
in police interviews (Ost et al., 2002).  
 
Other attempts to characterise retractors’ experiences tried to disentangle the 
issues of belief and recollection (see de Rivera & Sarbin, 1998).  For example 
Ost (2003), drawing on the work of Sir Frederic Bartlett, argued for the 
primacy of ‘attitudes’ (or beliefs) over recall (or recollection). Rather than 
directly recalling past events, Bartlett argued that people start by making 
inferences about their current circumstances based on what must have 
happened in their past (“This and this and this must have occurred in order that 
my present state should be what it is”; Bartlett, 1932, p. 202, emphasis added).  
This ‘attitude’2 then guides construction of the past, leading to “the eventual 
building up of the complete story accompanied by the more and more 
confident advance in a certain direction” (Bartlett, 1932, pp. 205). Recall is a 
construction made “largely on the basis of this attitude, and its general effect 
is that of a justification of the attitude” (Bartlett, 1932, p. 207).  This process, 
Bartlett suggested, was a response to a diverse and constantly changing 
environment that required “adaptability, fluidity and variety of response” 
(1932, p. 281).  Thus the changing (social) context was a critical determinant of 
recall and “the immediate situation sets the problems which they [the items 
‘picked out of schema’] are to help solve” (Bartlett, 1932, p. 297).   
 
                                                        
2
 The concept of ‘attitude’ is, according to some (e.g., Larsen & Berntsen, 2000), an overlooked aspect 
of Bartlett’s theory that refers to “an interpretation of [the] event from the particular perspective of the 
individual” (p. 103).   
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For Bartlett, then, ‘attitude’ (or ‘belief about the probable constituents’) set the 
stage for recall (or ‘recollection’).  Furthermore, the social context in which 
this “constant rationalisation” (p. 207) occurred determined “both the manner 
and the matter of recall” (p. 244).  In other words, the social context 
determined the ‘attitude’ (or belief) about the past, which drove memory 
construction.  Unfortunately, Bartlett’s important ideas about the adaptive 
and social nature of remembering, and the distinction between belief and 
recollection, were largely overlooked3 partly because of the way in which he 
summarised the findings of his own studies (Ost & Costall, 2002).  
 
It was not until much later that the distinction between memory and belief was 
formally incorporated into metacognitive models of memory (e.g., Mazzoni & 
Kirsch, 2002).  These models allowed for dissociations between memory and 
belief such that individuals could believe events had occurred despite being 
unable to recollect them, as well as the possibility that individuals could 
recollect events that they no longer believe happened to them (e.g., Scoboria, 
Mazzoni, Kirsch & Relyea, 2004; Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010).  More 
recently still, researchers have begun to investigate the strategies that people 
use to verify their memories (Wade & Garry, 2005; Wade, Nash & Garry, 
2014).  These two sets of literature provide frameworks that can be used to 
revisit retractors’ accounts and investigate their experiences of endorsing and 
                                                        
3
 See Edwards and Middleton (1987) and Edwards, Potter and Middleton (1992) for an 
account of remembering that draws on the social aspect of Bartlett’s theory. 
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then rejecting consequential events from their past.   It is to these two bodies 
of research that we now turn. 
 
Verifying memories: In repudiating their earlier recollections, retractors are 
making claims about whether or not certain events occurred.  But what 
strategies and evidence are they using to make those judgements?  Wade and 
Garry (2005) asked participants to recall a memory that they later found out to 
be false, as well as to imagine they had developed a false memory from 
participating in a ‘Lost in the mall’ type study (e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).  
They then asked participants to articulate the strategies that they had used, or 
would use, to verify those events.  The key finding was that the majority of 
strategies were either low cost, like asking other people (e.g., family 
members) or suboptimal, like trying to imagine whether the event had 
occurred or not (see Garry, Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 1996).  Later work 
confirmed that participants typically rely more on low cost, rather than 
reliable, strategies (Wade et al., 2014)4.  
 
In these verification studies, some participants recall (or imagine they had 
experienced) moderately significant, potentially upsetting, events (e.g., 
breaking their nose; becoming lost as a child).  Wade et al. (2014) noted, 
“subjects’ relative weighting of reliability and cost might shift if the memory 
                                                        
4 In a similar vein, Nash and Takarangi (2011) found that individuals who had experienced 
alcoholic blackouts were slightly more likely to seek information about events that had 
occurred during that blackout from someone who was similarly intoxicated at the time, 
rather than from someone who was sober.   
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they were verifying was of even greater emotional or personal importance” 
(p. 33).  Retractors’ accounts provide one source of data to tentatively address 
that issue; do people use markedly different sources of evidence when the 
events they are trying to verify are more consequential (i.e., do they rely on 
more ‘high cost’, reliable sources, like physical evidence)?  In addition, we can 
also look at the other side of the coin.  What factors were important in leading 
retractors to withdraw belief in their recollections?  To do this, we turn to the 
literature on non-believed memories. 
 
Nonbelieved memories: In 2002 Mazzoni and Kirsch argued that experiments 
on ‘false’ memories could be divided into those that studied autobiographical 
memory and those that studied autobiographical belief.  Scoboria et al. (2004) 
developed this further and proposed a formal model in which plausibility, 
belief and memory were presented as nested constructs.  In other words, in 
order to develop a false memory, an individual first needed to believe that the 
event occurred to him or her.  In order to believe that an event occurred, one 
needed to first believe that the event was plausible and could have happened 
to him or her.  Scoboria et al. (2004) further subdivided plausibility into 
general plausibility (i.e., something that could happen in principle) and 
personal plausibility (i.e., something that could happen to me).  In that paper 
they also noted that some 4% of cases they encountered did not fit neatly into 
this nested constructs model; these were cases in which people reported that 
they clearly recollected events that they were sure had not happened.  Citing 
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the anecdote about Piaget, the famous developmental psychologist, who 
claimed to vividly remember being abducted as a small child, despite 
learning that it had never occurred (see Loftus & Ketcham, 1991) they noted 
that, “it appears that memories for events which did not occur can continue to 
carry a strong sense of reality even once those who possess them are certain 
they did not occur” (Scoboria et al., 2004, p. 793).  Mazzoni et al. (2010) 
provided the first empirical data confirming this possibility (see also Otgaar, 
Scoboria & Smeets, 2013).  They surveyed 1593 US and UK undergraduates 
and found that just under 25% of them reported that they could recollect at 
least one event that they no longer believed happened, a phenomenon they 
termed nonbelieved memory (NBM; see Scoboria, Mazzoni & Boucher, in 
press, for a review).   
 
Do retractors’ accounts of withdrawing belief in their recollections provide 
evidence for the existence of high stake, non-believed memories for traumatic 
and personally relevant autobiographical events (Scoboria et al., in press)?  In 
the remainder of this article, memory verification strategies and the notion of 
non-believed memory (NBM) will be used as a conceptual frame for 
retractors’ experiences. Firstly, comparisons are made between the strategies 
that people have been shown to use to verify moderately significant events 
(e.g., Wade et al., 2014), and retractors’ reports of coming to believe in or 
recollect traumatic memories of sexual abuse – is there any evidence that 
retractors use ‘high cost’ reliable strategies to verify these life changing beliefs 
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or recollections?  Secondly, comparisons are drawn between retractors’ 
accounts of the repudiation of their beliefs and recollections and the largest 
systematic exploration of this issue with naturalistic NBMs in the published 
literature to date (Scoboria et al., 2015).  Are the dynamics of withdrawing 
belief similar when the events are highly consequential?  Thirdly, using the 
qualitative descriptions of what it was that retractors were actually endorsing 
and then rejecting, the focus then moves to an examination of how well the 
two characteristics of nonbelieved memories (the belief in occurrence is 
attenuated yet the mental representation continues to be experienced as a 
memory) represent retractors’ experiences.  To address these questions, the 
literature on retractors’ experiences was re-examined and coded as outlined 
below. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sources of data 
 
A literature review was conducted on Google ScholarTM using the search 
terms ‘retractor’, ‘memory’ and combinations of the two to identify sources 
that focussed on how retractors came to endorse and then reject beliefs or 
recollections of abuse.  As a result, several articles and chapters (Ashmore & 
Brown, 2010; Davis, 2005; de Rivera, 1998; Fetkewicz, Sharma & Merskey, 
2000; Ost et al., 2002; Woodiwiss, 2010) were reviewed but excluded from the 
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analysis presented here because, although they refer to retractors, they did 
not focus explicitly on the process of endorsing and withdrawing belief. 
Inspecting citations of the remaining studies then identified more recent 
work.  This was not intended as an exhaustive search of every publication 
that mentioned retractors; rather it served to identify key published work that 
contained data that could be compared – at least on a conceptual or thematic 
level – to the findings of Wade et al. (2014) and Scoboria et al. (2015).  
 
The final dataset consisted of three books containing case studies or anecdotal 
accounts (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993; Pendergrast, 1996; Maran, 2010), one 
unpublished thesis containing quotes from a survey (Ost, 2000), and seven 
articles and chapters containing case studies or summaries of surveys and 
interviews (de Rivera, 1997; de Rivera, 2000; Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995; McElroy 
& Keck, 1995; Nelson & Simpson, 1994; Ost et al., 2001; Ost & Nunkoosing, 
2010).  Excluding accounts that were clearly from the same person (e.g., an 
account by Laura Pasley is reported in both Goldstein & Farmer, 1993 and 
Pendergrast, 1996) resulted in a nominal sample of 158 retractors.  This figure 
must be interpreted with extreme caution however, as it is almost certain that 
some of the individuals who served as case studies in Goldstein and Farmer 
(1993) and Pendergrast (1996) also participated in later surveys and 
interviews in other published work.  Where there was a clear, or likely 
duplication, cases were only coded once.  Furthermore, some studies (e.g., see 
de Rivera, 2000, p. 381) had already summarised responses from many 
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respondents into categories, thus there may originally have been subtleties in 
those original data (i.e., pre-categorisation) that could not be captured by the 
current coding scheme. The full range of data coded can be found in the 
Supplementary Data online. 
 
Coding 
 
The author conducted all the coding, and the full dataset (and coding scheme) 
can be found in the Supplementary Materials.  The first stage of coding 
involved reviewing all published accounts and recording verbatim where 
descriptions were given of sources of evidence that supported the beliefs or 
recollections about abuse using the categories identified by Wade et al. (2014).  
The categories were: (1) Searching for physical evidence; (2) Asking another 
person – family; (3) Asking another person – other; (4) Cognitive techniques; 
and (5) Searching for additional cues. 
 
The second stage of coding involved recording verbatim where explanations 
were given regarding the cause(s) of retraction.  In NBM terminology, what 
was it that caused retractors to attenuate belief in their recollections?  In 
almost all of the case studies and anecdotal accounts, such an explanation 
could be located, although in the survey studies (e.g., Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995) 
such information was difficult to extract systematically, as typically only 
group level data were reported.  The subcategories described by Scoboria et 
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al. (2015) were used as a guide here.  These were: (1) Social feedback; (2) Event 
plausibility; (3) Alternative attributions; (4) General beliefs regarding 
memory; (5) Internal memorial characteristics; (6) Notions of self / others; (7) 
External evidence; (8) Personal motivation; and (9) Other.  
 
The final stage of coding involved a examination of the retractor literature to 
identify any self-reports of the quality of their initial beliefs and/or 
recollections.  This was more challenging, as detailed accounts like this were 
not included in the published literature in any systematic fashion (the only 
exception was found in de Rivera, 2000, p. 381).  Nevertheless it was possible 
to find key exemplars that matched almost all possible combinations of belief 
and recollection, not just recollections where belief was attenuated (i.e., 
nonbelieved memories).  These exemplars are simply presented here as prima 
facie evidence for the existence of such categories, and no claims are (or can 
be) made about their prevalence. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
What sources of evidence did retractors use to ‘verify’ their beliefs or recollections (or 
what sources of evidence were they exposed to)? 
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Recall that, in Wade and Garry (2005) and Wade et al. (2014), participants 
suggested strategies that they would use (or had used) to verify their 
recollections.  No similar data exist in the retractors literature.   
As shown in Table 1, there were almost no clear examples of retractors using 
explicit ‘strategies’ to try and establish whether they had been abused or not.  
Far more common was that retractors reported being exposed to various 
sources of evidence.  For example, where Wade et al.’s (2014) participants 
report ‘searching for physical evidence’ to validate their recollections, 
retractors report ‘being presented with physical / psychological evidence’ to 
validate the allegation that they had been sexually abused.  Where 
participants in Wade et al. (2014) report using cognitive techniques, retractors 
report having been subjected to ‘memory recovery techniques’ and so on.  
Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows, at least at a conceptual level there appears to 
be a reasonable degree of overlap between the sources of evidence (e.g., 
physical evidence, other people, cognitive strategies, search for additional 
cues) reported by Wade et al.’s (2014) participants and retractors’ 
retrospective accounts of why they came to endorse their beliefs or 
recollections of abuse.   
 
As shown in Table 2, analysis of retractors’ reports found no evidence that 
any of them searched for objective evidence that the abuse had occurred. 
Interestingly, however, allegedly ‘objective’ physical (n=4) and psychological 
evidence (n=4) was occasionally offered to them in the form of interpretations 
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of ‘body memories’ or flashbacks5.  Of course, being ‘offered’ evidence is very 
different from actively ‘seeking’ evidence.  The latter is indeed a strategy that 
one might employ where the former is not.  Nevertheless, these two 
categories were compared here as they both speak to the way in which 
external evidence was used to support or attenuate beliefs and recollections.  
There was also limited evidence that retractors spoke to other family 
members about their beliefs or recollections.  However, retractors’ reports 
suggest that people other than family members were key in convincing them 
that they had been sexually abused (n=9).  In the majority of cases (n=6) that 
person was a therapist or counsellor.  Only one of Wade et al.’s strategies 
(thinking back to an event in order to recall more information) appeared to be 
used by retractors. Indeed a few retractors (n=4) reported trying this (“Spent a 
week trying to remember”; Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, p. 288).  A larger 
proportion of retractors (n=13) reported being the subject of memory recovery 
techniques (e.g., “He [therapist] kept insisting that I close my eyes and picture 
my abuse”; Pendergrast, 1996, p. 388).  Wade et al.’s (2014) final category 
concerns cases where individuals search for additional cues to verify their 
memories (e.g., they might return to a street they grew up on).  Again, no 
clear examples could be located where retractors explicitly mentioned doing 
this.  The best conceptual match to this strategy was when they reported (n=9) 
                                                        
5 The notion of body memories is exemplified by the work of van der Kolk (1994), and 
proposes that while the ‘mind’ forgets, the ‘body’ remembers.  There is, as yet, no clear 
support for such a mechanism (Lynn, Krackow, Loftus, Locke & Lilienfeld, 2015).  Flashbacks, 
of course, are a key diagnostic symptom of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.  Yet, like any 
memories, flashbacks are subject to change and distortion (McNally, 2003).  The reliability of 
the physical or psychological evidence that retractors reported being presented with is 
therefore open to question. 
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that they had been told to search for additional cues, or evidence, that they 
had been abused – and this often took the form of being told to follow 
guidance advocated in self-help books (e.g., The Courage to Heal; Bass & Davis, 
1988).   
 
In addition to the five strategy categories identified by Wade et al. (2014) there 
were two additional categories reported by retractors.  These described 
processes of strong social influence.  The first referred to the effects of 
medication (n=6).  For example, one retractor reported, “My days were filled 
with taking drugs that sometimes altered my ability to understand what was 
happening to me” (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, p. 228). The second category 
(n=6) referred to changes in their immediate social context.  Several examples 
(n=4) were found where retractors reported that being hospitalized was an 
important precursor to the development of their beliefs and recollections 
about abuse (e.g., “During the next year, Doris was hospitalized 14 times”; de 
Rivera, 1997, p. 287). 
 
In summary, the sources of evidence (physical, social) that people report 
using to try and verify moderately significant events seem to apply to high 
stakes events too.  The key differences are that, for retractors, the evidence 
seems to have been presented to them, rather than being strategies they used 
spontaneously.  Searching for ‘objective’ evidence was rarely mentioned.  
Although this latter finding might seem surprising given the potential gravity 
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of coming to believe you were sexually abused, it is perhaps not surprising 
given the dynamics of these particular claims (i.e., as an adult there might be 
little hope of finding objective evidence of abuse that allegedly occurred when 
you were a child).  Nevertheless they were sometimes presented with 
‘objective’ physical or psychological evidence that ‘confirmed’ the abuse 
hypothesis.   
 
Retractors reported relying on ‘social’ sources of evidence (e.g., asking other 
people) far less frequently than participants in Wade et al.’s studies.  Again 
this is not surprising, as the specific events they were attempting to verify 
were ones allegedly perpetrated by the very people they might have tried to 
seek verification from (e.g., parents).  Social sources of ‘evidence’ were 
nevertheless reported as important precursors to the repudiation of beliefs 
and recollections.  Furthermore, retractors’ reports contained many examples 
of the use of suboptimal ‘cognitive techniques’ to facilitate recall (e.g., Lynn et 
al., 2015).  Importantly, some retractors reported that social influence tactics 
had been key to convincing them that they had indeed been victims of sexual 
abuse (e.g., the use of medication, hospitalisation).   
 
Why did retractors attenuate belief in their recollections? 
 
The second analysis compared the reasons given by retractors for repudiating 
their recollections of abuse with the reasons that participants in Scoboria et 
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al.’s (2015) study gave for withdrawing or attenuating belief in their 
recollections.  Table 3 shows the nine overarching categories derived by 
Scoboria et al., (2015), although their more comprehensive sub-categories were 
used for the initial coding (see Supplementary Material online).  The middle 
column of Table 3 shows the number of participants in Scoboria et al.’s (2015) 
study who endorsed each of the categories.  The rightmost column shows the 
number of exemplars of each category that could be located in the published 
retractor literature. 
 
--Table 3 about here-- 
 
Scoboria et al. (2015) found that social feedback, followed by (a lack of) event 
plausibility were the most frequently reported reasons why participants in 
their study reported attenuating belief in a memory.  Looking at the retractor 
literature, social feedback played a key role and, although external evidence 
seemed to be the largest category, the search for (dis)confirming physical 
evidence was rare (n=3).  For example, de Rivera (2000, p. 382) noted one 
retractor who reported that the, “Memories in hypnosis did not match scars 
on body”.  More common (n=39) was that retractors encountered external 
evidence in the form of newspaper or magazine articles that raised questions 
about, or were critical of, the kinds of experiences they had had.  Others 
explicitly sought out evidence.  For example, one retractor reported that she 
“took a psychology class and read about ‘cognitive dissonance’ and … bought 
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a book … which helped [her] to understand the way memory really works” 
(Ost, 2000, p. 120).    
 
As far as social feedback was concerned, in the majority of cases (n=22), this 
was related to the behaviour of their current therapist (“too dogmatic or was 
inconsistent”; de Rivera, 2000, p. 382).  The remainder of reports in this 
category (n=9) could be described as cases where retractors were told directly 
(by a friend or new therapist) that the events did not occur, or it was 
suggested to them that the events were unlikely to have happened.  As noted, 
there was little evidence that retractors withdrew belief because the event 
they remembered lacked plausibility perhaps because, as noted, sexual abuse 
is known to be a common and under-reported crime (indeed Pezdek, 
Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Hart & Schooler, 2006, and Rubin & Boals, 2010, provide 
evidence that unremembered sexual abuse is considered to be plausible by a 
sizeable proportion of the population).  The few examples that did fall into 
this category (n=3) are best described as cases where, “the memories became 
more and more bizarre” (Ost, 2000, p. 119).   
 
Scoboria et al. (2015) also report examples where belief had been withdrawn 
because the recollections did not ‘feel like’ other memories.  There were a few 
examples (n=4) of this sort in the retractors’ data.  For example, one retractor 
wrote, “It didn’t feel like regular memories to me.  Certain aspects of the 
memories I knew were real … but these were pieced together haphazardly, 
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interwoven into a scene of sexual abuse that didn’t feel real” (Lief & 
Fetkewicz, 1995, p. 427).  In other cases they, “figured out … that everything 
had been a figment of my imagination” (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, p. 279) or 
realised that they had made a source misattribution (Lindsay, 2008) by tracing 
their visualizations to particular books or films (e.g., Pendergrast, 1996, p. 364; 
see also Heaton & Wilson, 1998). 
 
--Table 4 about here-- 
 
In addition to the categories provided by Scoboria et al. (2015), two new 
categories (and subcategories) emerged from the present data.  As shown in 
Table 4, the largest category (n = 19) consisted of cases where retractors 
reported that a change in context (location, social situation, counselling or 
treatment) prompted them to question their memories (“The longer I stayed 
out of therapy, the more I started seeing it for what it was.  The voices started 
disappearing from my head, that was a biggie”; Pendergrast, 1996, p. 384).  A 
smaller category (n = 4) consisted of cases where either they, or someone they 
knew, noticed deterioration in their health (“ … a lot of good friends … said, 
‘You’re looking like shit, not making any sense, what are you doing?’”; 
Pendergrast, 1996, p. 384).  Whilst this latter category might, arguably, be 
subsumed under Scoboria et al.’s (2015) category of social feedback, it was 
retained as a separate category for present purposes because the social 
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feedback was not directly related to the recollection, rather the person’s 
ongoing deterioration.   
 
In summary, the most frequently endorsed reason for withdrawing belief that 
appeared in retractors’ accounts related to external evidence, generally in the 
form of media reports that highlighted the possibility that people could 
misremember sexual abuse.  Social feedback was the next most frequently 
endorsed reason for withdrawing belief, mostly as a result of inconsistent 
behaviour on the part of the person treating them.  As with the verification 
strategies, a change of context (e.g., discontinuing or changing therapy or 
medication) was mentioned by a reasonable number of retractors as having 
an impact on their beliefs or recollections of abuse (see also de Rivera’s 1997 
discussion of the ‘mind control’ account, pp. 171-2).   Having established that 
retractors’ reports of the reasons they withdrew belief in their recollections 
matches fairly closely to the reasons for attenuating belief identified in the 
NBM literature (Scoboria et al., 2015) we now move to the third question.  
Does the definition of NBM accurately capture retractors’ experiences? 
 
Do retractors’ descriptions of their recollections look like non-believed memories? 
 
--Table 5 about here-- 
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Recall that NBMs studied in the laboratory or with undergraduate samples 
are characterised as mental representations that have a strong recollective 
quality, but where the belief in occurrence has been attenuated.  Do retractors’ 
descriptions of their now retracted abuse memories have those same 
qualities?  In fact, as shown in Table 5, it was possible to find descriptions of 
all possible combinations of belief and memory in retractors’ accounts, not 
just cases where there was a recollection accompanied by a stated lack of 
belief.  For example, there was a case where a retractor reported that they 
never ‘recalled’ anything, but was ‘playing with the idea’ that she had been 
abused (uncertain belief and no recollection; de Rivera, 1997, p. 284).  In 
another case, there were no recollections, but a strong belief that abuse had 
occurred at a young age (belief but no recollection; Pendergrast, 1996, p. 367), 
and in another vivid ‘visions’ of abuse that seemed so real (belief plus 
recollection; presumably a report of a recollection, pre-retraction; Pendergrast, 
1996, pp. 353-4).  There were also cases that met the criteria for NBM where, 
despite rejecting the belief that she had been abused, an individual still 
experienced intrusive imagery (no belief, recollection; McElroy & Keck, 1995, 
p. 733).  Finally, there was the case reported in Ost and Nunkoosing (2010) 
where the recollections were reported as being contingent on the individual’s 
illness.  She reported that she only had recollections when she was ill, and did 
not experience them now she was ‘better’ (no belief, uncertain about 
recollections). 
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What these different examples illustrate is that retractors’ experiences do not 
fit neatly into the category of a non-believed memory (cf. Scoboria et al., in 
press).  It also suggests the primacy of belief as a precursor to (false) 
recollection (Scoboria et al., 2004).  While there were cases where recollection 
occurred without belief, this was only found after the beliefs about abuse had 
been rejected.  No examples were found where an individual had a vivid 
recollection of abuse that they actively rejected for a long time, before 
becoming convinced of the ‘truth’ of the recollection6 – the recollection 
seemed to follow the belief (for important work on the related topic of false 
denials, see Otgaar, Howe, Smeets & Wang, in press).   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
 
The key findings of this conceptual and empirical analysis were that the 
strategies identified in the memory verification literature and the categories 
proposed in the non-believed memories literatures had parallels in the limited 
literature on retractors’ experiences.  Thus the sources of evidence used to 
attempt to verify, or to attenuate belief in, moderately upsetting events also 
apply to high stakes, consequential events like sexual abuse.  Perhaps this is 
not surprising as there are, in principle, only so many ways of establishing the 
truth of any given recollection – that is unlikely to change as a function of the 
                                                        
6 Although this scenario might be more common in cases where a long-held memory is 
suddenly recognized as an episode of abuse once the individual acquires an understanding of 
sexual behavior (e.g., reaches puberty, receives sex education classes at school; see McNally & 
Geraerts, 2009) 
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seriousness of the event in question.  Nevertheless there were also some 
noteworthy differences.   
 
Firstly, retractors’ reports contained many examples where they were exposed 
to sources of evidence rather than using such evidence strategically or 
spontaneously to verify their beliefs or recollections.  It is not possible to 
determine, of course, whether this is a fair characterisation, or whether it is an 
attempt to resolve the dissonance of repudiating such a consequential set of 
beliefs or recollections.  In other words, one way to explain how you could 
have come to believe in traumatic events that you now believe did not 
happen to you is to emphasise the coercive and non-voluntary nature of the 
context in which those beliefs originally arose (see Gudjonsson, 1997; Ost et 
al., 2001).  Also, as previously noted, the conceptual comparison is not perfect, 
as being exposed to evidence is very different from the ways in which people 
report that they would strategically seek out evidence to verify their memories 
(Wade & Garry, 2005; Wade et al., 2014). 
 
Secondly, changes in the wider social context seemed to be important in terms 
of ‘verifying’, as well as attenuating, retractors’ beliefs (Bartlett, 1932).  This 
may illustrate the lengths to which one might need to go to in order to 
persuade someone that they had been abused (if we take retractors at their 
word that no such abuse had occurred), and that false beliefs or recollections 
of consequential events (e.g., abuse) might be contingent on being immersed 
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in a social environment that supports such beliefs.  For retractors, or course, it 
is not simply the case that belief in their recollection needs to be attenuated.  
They also need to somehow resolve the catastrophic interpersonal dynamics 
of having – they now believe falsely – accused another person (usually a 
family member) of the most serious crimes7.   
 
Given the gravity of both making and then repudiating such serious 
allegations it is perhaps not surprising that reports of social support (or social 
influence; Ost et al., 2001) were cited as important determinants in the 
endorsement, and subsequent repudiation, of their accounts.  One might 
speculate that the immediate social context served at first to increase, and 
later to decrease, the personal plausibility of sexual abuse as an explanatory 
framework, or supported those beliefs (Scoboria et al., 2004; but see Pezdek, 
Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Hart & Schooler, 2006; Rubin & Boals, 2010).  Borrowing 
from the source-monitoring framework (Lindsay, 2008), one might also call 
this socially-situated source attribution.  But just because a history of abuse 
might be seen as a personally plausible event, it does not mean that one 
would develop (false) beliefs or recollections about having been a victim of 
such abuse, sometimes to the detriment of one’s own health (Fetkewicz et al., 
2000). 
 
                                                        
7
 Indeed anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a subset of retractors, sometimes referred to as 
‘returners’.  These are individuals who attempt to reestablish contact with the people they accused 
without ever publicly retracting (or in some cases talking about) their previous allegations.   
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Yet in certain contexts, false beliefs, (mis)beliefs, or vacillating beliefs, may not 
necessarily be maladaptive (e.g., McKay & Dennett, 2009).  After spending 
“ten weeks in a hospital” attending multiple personality groups (Goldstein & 
Farmer, 1993, pp. 388-389) it is perhaps ‘locally adaptive’ to endorse a 
(mis)belief that one indeed might have been abused in order to get support or 
treatment.  Conversely, upon leaving such an environment, it is possible that 
revising one’s belief is also ‘locally adaptive’, enabling one to distance oneself 
from earlier claims (i.e., “I was the victim of poor therapy”).  In other words, 
beliefs can be context specific, and vacillate rapidly depending on the 
environment one is in (see also Nash, Wheeler & Hope, 2015). 
 
Critically, for some retractors, belief was as far as it went.  They never 
‘recollected’ sexual abuse.  Others retractors did ‘recollect’ vivid instances of 
sexual abuse that they later disowned.  But here, the same point applies.  A 
recollection that serves an explanatory function for one’s life at a particular 
time might be more likely to be endorsed / believed (Ashmore & Brown, 
2010).  If one’s life circumstances change, that recollection no longer serves a 
useful function and may cease to be believed, or attributed to another source 
(e.g., a result of drug-induced hallucinations).  Crudely put, if you are ill, 
there must be a cause of that illness, and ‘recollections’ of abuse might 
provide such evidence.  Conversely, if you believe that you have been the 
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victim of poor counselling, then ‘false’ recollections may be evidence of that 
too8.   
 
All of this speaks to the wider point that remembering (regardless of 
accuracy) is an inherently social phenomenon (Bartlett, 1932; Blank, 2009; 
Blank, Walther & Isemann, in press; Marsh, 2007; Newman & Lindsay, 2009; 
Ost & Costall, 2002).  From that perspective, remembering is social action that 
serves a function (Bartlett, 1932; Hyman, 1999); ‘beliefs’ or ‘recollections’ are 
used to either validate one’s claims to have been abused, or to have been a 
victim of ‘false’ memory or poor therapy (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010).  More 
importantly, the same beliefs or recollections can serve different functions 
depending on the immediate context (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010).  The fact that 
people can change their minds about the same set of recollections suggests 
that Bartlett and later theorists (e.g., Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Scoboria et al., 
2004) were correct and that it is belief (whether or not it corresponds to 
reality) not recollection that serves as the primary driver of people’s decisions 
about the past.  This is supported by anecdotal accounts of retractors who 
have retracted their retractions (Hardy, 2015). 
 
Before concluding, some notes of caution are warranted.  Firstly, these 
findings are based on an examination of the limited research literature on 
retractors.  One must be careful not to over-interpret these data given the 
                                                        
8 The phrase ‘ontological gerrymandering’ has been used to describe the “phenomenon of 
revising history to fit with current understandings” (Ashmore & Brown, 2010, p. 24).  
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limitations and likely biases in those original studies; some of which were 
conducted more than 20 years ago at the height of the ‘memory wars’ (see 
Read & Lindsay, 2007).  The likely biases in such data have been discussed at 
length elsewhere (see Ost et al., 2002).  Secondly, these data relate to now 
disowned beliefs and recollections about sexual abuse.  Important 
unanswered questions remain about how (or whether) individuals seek to 
verify beliefs or recollections about continuously remembered episodes of 
abuse, particularly when those events occurred many years previously.  This 
is particularly important given the research detailing the substantial barriers 
to disclosure in cases involving allegations of sexual abuse (e.g., London, 
Bruck, Ceci & Shuman, 2007).  The conclusions of the current analysis are 
therefore best characterised as provisional and in need of more controlled and 
systematic work.  Bearing these important caveats in mind, some tentative 
conclusions can nevertheless be offered. 
 
Are retractors’ recollections clear examples of high stakes, consequential non-
believed memories (Scoboria et al., in press)?  Some may be, some might not 
be.  Some never “got” memories (Ost, 2003).  As Bartlett (1932) suggested, 
reasoning, rather than conscious recollection, is important in inferring the 
“probable constituents” of one’s past, and that socially-situated beliefs (or 
‘attitudes’) then drive recollection.  As Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) noted, 
recollection does not necessarily follow from belief, as many people believe 
things happened to them that they do not consciously recollect (e.g., that they 
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were fed after they were born; a possibility also formalised in Scoboria et al.’s, 
2004, nested construct model).  It seems that, for some retractors at least, the 
same may be true; their belief about the past was more important than 
whether they could recollect any instances of abuse (see also Nash, Wheeler & 
Hope, 2015).  Furthermore, social contextual factors were critical in both the 
endorsement, and subsequent repudiation, of their beliefs and recollections of 
abuse.  Whether these social factors ‘caused’ or merely supported (or 
subsequently failed to support) these now disowned beliefs and recollections 
is impossible to establish.  What is clear though is that a “recollection” is 
simply one additional piece of evidence that people use to make decisions 
about their personal history, and is neither a necessary nor sufficient source of 
evidence for validating or invalidating beliefs about high stakes consequential 
events from the past.  
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 Table 1. Conceptual mapping of Wade et al.’s (2014) strategies to conceptually related sources of evidence used to ‘verify’ 
retractors’ recollections or beliefs. 
 
 
Strategies (from Wade et al., 2014) 
 
Source of ‘evidence’ in retractor literature Exemplar 
Search for physical evidence 
 
Presented with ‘physical’ or ‘psychological’ 
evidence 
Interpreting ‘body memory’ [choking] as indicative of abuse (Pendergrast, 
1996, p. 378) 
Asking another person – family 
 
Being told by another person – family For some reason my ex-husband is convinced now that my dad did abuse 
me (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010, pp. 24-25) 
Asking another person – other 
 
Being told by another person – other Therapist kept telling her that he father had sexually abused her (de Rivera, 
1997, p. 286) 
Cognitive techniques 
 
Memory recovery techniques Instructed to draw pictures of anything that came to mind, free association 
(McElroy & Keck, 1995, p. 732) 
Searching for additional cues 
 
Told to search for additional cues / self help 
books 
Encouraged to read The Courage to Heal (Pendergrast, 1996, p. 381) 
 Other – medication My days were filled with taking drugs that sometimes altered my ability to 
understand what was happening to me (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, p. 228) 
 
 
Other – change of context Ten weeks in hospital … attended MPD (multiple personality disorder) 
group (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993, pp. 388-389) 
 
Note: Wade et al.’s (2014) categories in bold font, conceptually related source of evidence reported in the retractor literature in 
italics. 
 
  
 Table 2.  Sources of evidence – comparison of Wade et al.’s (2014) categories and retractor literature. 
 
 Wade et al. (2014)*  Retractors literature 
Evidence consulted (from Wade et al., 2014) 
 
  
Conceptually related source of evidence in retractor literature 
 
N 1105  56 ** 
Search for physical evidence 
 
37.5% 
-- 
 
Presented with ‘physical’ or ‘psychological’ evidence 
-- 
(14%) 
Asking another person – family 
 
27.0% 
-- 
 
Being told by another person – family 
-- 
(3.5%) 
Asking another person – other 
 
26.2% 
-- 
 
Being told by another person – other 
-- 
(16%) 
Cognitive techniques 
 
3.5% 
-- 
 
Memory recovery techniques 
7% 
(23%) 
Searching for additional cues 
 
5.9% 
-- 
 
Told to search for additional cues / self help books 
-- 
(16%) 
 --  
Other – medication 
 
(10%) 
 
 
--  
Other – change of context 
 
(10%) 
 
Notes: Wade et al.’s (2014) categories in bold font, conceptually related strategies from the retractor literature in italics. * 
Percentages taken from p. 30 of Wade et al. (2014). ** The total number of individual descriptions that could be found in the 
retractor literature (see supplementary materials). 
 
 Table 3.  Reason for attenuating belief in memory – comparison of Scoboria et 
al.’s (2015) categories and retractor literature. 
 
 Scoboria et al. 
(2015)* 
Retractors 
literature ** 
N 374 ~158 *** 
Social feedback (12 sub categories) 158   (42.2%) 31   (19.6%) 
Event plausibility (2 sub categories) 73     (19.5%) 3     (1.8%) 
Alternative attributions (4 sub categories) 33     (8.8%) 2     (1.2%) 
General beliefs re: memory (3 sub categories) 24     (6.4%) 1     (0.6%) 
Internal memorial characteristics 27     (7.2%) 4     (2.5%) 
Notions of self / others (2 sub categories) 24     (6.4%) 0     (0.0%) 
External (2 sub categories) 27     (7.2%) 43   (27.2%) 
Personal motivation 4       (1.1%) 3     (1.8%) 
Other 4       (1.1%) 2     (1.2%) 
 
Notes: * Taken from Table 2, column 3 of Scoboria et al. (2015, p. 8) and refers 
to the category judged as the ‘primary’ reason for attenuating belief. ** 
Reasons do not sum to 158 because, in some cases, nothing is explicitly 
mentioned about what motivated the retraction (e.g. Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995). 
*** Likely duplicates across studies – obvious cases only coded once (e.g., 
Laura Pasley, Beth Rutherford). 
 
  
 Table 4. New categories of reason for attenuating belief in memory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New categories (and 
subcategories) 
n Exemplar 
Change of context 19  
Change of therapy (no          
direct questioning) 
3  “At this [new] hospital I gained a new outlook and began 
to trust my own intuitions” (Goldstein & Farmer, 1993 p. 
230) 
 
Leaving therapy 
(voluntary) 
 
6 
 
“Within two weeks of leaving therapy I realized that my 
memories were false” (Nelson & Simpson, 1994, p. 125) 
 
Leaving therapy 
(involuntary) 
2 “Ran out of money, kicked out [of therapy] cold turkey, 
praise God!” (Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995, p. 426) 
 
Stopping medication 7 “I also lowered my medications so that I could think 
more clearly and went off a medication that affects 
memory” (Ost, 2000, p. 120) 
Isolated from family 1 “ … after only 4 days, Ann missed her children and 
husband so much that she changed her ticket and flew 
home” (de Rivera, 1997, p. 278) 
Noticing 
deterioration 
 
4 
 
Noticed themselves 2 “By 1990 I’d been following the instructions in The 
Courage to Heal for two years, with negligible results.  I 
decided to try a different way to heal” (Maran, 2010, p. 
132) 
Noticed by others 2 [Friends] “said, ‘You’re looking like shit, not making any 
sense, what are you doing?’” (Pendergrast, 1996, p. 384) 
  
Table 5. Combinations of memory and belief evidenced in retractors’ 
accounts. 
 
 
 
 
‘Belief’ ‘Memory’ Example 
 
? 
 
No 
 
“At this point, the investigator remarked, ‘It doesn’t sound like you ever 
really had memories of being abused.  It sounds like you were kind of 
playing with the idea of being abused,” (de Rivera, 1997, p. 284). 
   
Yes No “I never developed any specific times and places, but I was sure the 
abuse had occurred on a continual basis between the ages of 5 and 15” 
(Pendergrast, 1996, p. 367) 
   
Yes Yes “The visions in my head were of severe physical and sexual abuse.  The 
images were so incredibly bizarre but seemed so real” (Pendergrast, 
1996, pp. 353-4). 
   
No Yes “Ms. B continues to experience the intrusion of false memories 
approximately once per month...” (McElroy & Keck, 1995, p. 733) 
   
No ? “… the memories that I had when I was ill, although I … certainly can’t 
remember them anyway.  I mean I remember when … I was ill.  I could 
tell you [in] huge, vivid graphic detail all of this, I wouldn’t even be able 
to do that now” (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010, p. 29) 
 
 
